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IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPETITION IN THE PROVISIONS OF ELECTRIC SERVICES THROUGHOUT THE STATE OF ARIZONA.

DOCKET NO. RE-00000C-94-0165

CITIZENS UTILITIES COMPANY'S EXCEPTIONS

On July 24, 1998, the Commission Staff filed proposed modifications to the Commission's Retail Electric Competition Rules. Although Citizens Utilities Company ("Citizens") and other parties filed comments on these rules on July 22, 1998, it does not appear that those comments were considered in Staff's final proposal. Therefore, Citizens hereby incorporates those comments into this filing, and requests that the Commission consider them as Citizens' Exceptions to the Proposed Order.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of August, 1998.

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Craig A. Marks

Associate General Counsel Citizens Utilities Company

2901 N. Central Avenue, Ste. 1660

mon

Phoenix, Arizona 85012

Original and ten copies of the foregoing filed this 3rd day of August, 1998, with:

Docket Control Division Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 West Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007

Copies of the foregoing mailed or hand delivered this 3rd day of August, 1998, to:

(Courtesy copy of July 22, 1998, filing provided to Commissioners and Commission Staff only.)

Jerry Rudibaugh Chief Hearing Officer Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 West Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007

Paul Bullis Christopher Kempley Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 West Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007

Ray Williamson Acting Director, Utilities Division Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 West Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007

All Parties indicated on Service List

By Joann Zygodewicz

BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

JIM IRVIN

COMMISSIONER--CHAIRMAN

RENZ D. JENNINGS

COMMISSIONER

CARL J. KUNASEK

COMMISSIONER

AZ CORP COMMISSION

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IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPETITION IN THE PROVISIONS OF ELECTRIC SERVICES THROUGHOUT THE STATE OF ARIZONA.

CITIZENS UTILITIES
COMPANY'S COMMENTS ON
STAFF'S SECOND DRAFT OF

RETAIL ELECTRIC
COMPETITION RULES

Citizens Utilities Company ("Citizens") submits its comments on the July 13, 1998, draft rules circulated by the Staff of the Arizona Corporation Commission. Citizens appreciates and understands the hard work that the Staff has put forth to bring this document to this point and commends the Staff for producing a functional set of rules to guide electric competition in Arizona. Citizens offers the following comments in the spirit of only fine-tuning the draft rules to clarify ambiguities and to steer around some potential future pitfalls. Although these comments reflect Citizens' best judgment at this time, Citizens reserves the right upon further study and consideration to take different positions in the formal rulemaking.

Citizens' remaining comments fall into four general areas: Standard Offer Transmission Access; Metering, Billing, and Collection Services; Affiliate Transactions; and the Information Disclosure Label. Following its comments in these four areas, Citizens will offer a few miscellaneous comments on other sections of the rules.

STANDARD OFFER TRANSMISSION ACCESS

Under R14-2-1610 (A), the current draft rules provide non-preferential open access to transmission capacity whether customers elect to purchase power competitively or continue taking service under the Affected Utility's Standard Offer. This requirement improperly threatens the reliability of transmission service to customers who should have the reasonable expectation of maintaining their level of reliability. Standard Offer customers should be given priority access to available transmission capacity for as long as the duty to serve these customers on a regulated basis remains with the UDC. An example illustrates why Citizens takes this position.

Assume there is a fast-growing population center with peak loads of 100 MW served by transmission facilities with 115 MW of load-carrying capacity. With the introduction of open access, a portion of customer loads elects to take competitive electric power. In the meantime, the Affected Utility's load continues to grow to the point that the total load is about to exceed the capacity of the available transmission.

Two remedies to the capacity situation exist: 1) build additional transmission or local generation capacity; or 2) move some customer loads to non-firm (interruptible) transmission service as an interim measure.

If, in this example, new capacity is not built in time to meet load growth, which customers should be at risk of losing firm transmission service? In Citizens' view, the customers who elected competitive services should be at risk. Presumably, the workings of the marketplace would alleviate the capacity shortage over the longer term. However, to the extent there is a short-term capacity issue, those who had voluntarily sought the rewards of the competitive marketplace should bear the correspondingly increased risks that may exists during periods when adequate firm transmission service for the lower-cost power is not available. Conversely, those customers who elected to remain with the traditional, regulated power provider, foregoing opportunities associated with competitive generation supply, should be given priority access

to firm transmission service. Fairness dictates that the party seeking the rewards of competition should not be allowed to avail itself of the safety-net of the standard offer provider.

Consequently, Citizens suggests that R14-2-1610 (A) be modified as follows:

<u>Under normal operating conditions</u>, the Affected Utilities shall provide non-discriminatory open access to transmission and distribution facilities to serve all customers. <u>In general</u>, no preference or priority shall be given to any distribution customer based on whether the customer is purchasing power under the Affected Utility's <u>or UDC's</u> Standard Offer or in the competitive market. <u>Under these circumstances</u>, any transmission capacity that is available for use by the retail customers of the Affect Utility <u>or UDC</u> shall be allocated among Standard Offer customers and competitive market customers on a pro-rata basis. <u>However</u>, in the event that a shortage of capacity for transmitting power into an Affected Utility's service territory exists, Standard Offer customers will be given priority access to available firm transmission capacity.

METERING, BILLING, AND COLLECTION SERVICES

Under R14-2-1616 (A), Affected Utilities would be required to divest "all competitive...services" to an unaffiliated party or to a separate affiliate. This would include metering, billing, and collection services, which would be competitive services under the rules. For Citizens, and other smaller utilities,¹ this requirement could very well result in higher costs to customers for these services. This is mainly because of the lack of economies of scale in rural, second, and third-tier markets for supporting separated competitive metering, billing, and collection functions. In short, smaller communities lack the critical mass needed for spun-off utility services operations to continue to provide these services at historical cost levels. Separation of these functions from Affected Utilities would cause additional costs, such as new office, warehousing and mechanical shop space, new vehicles no longer shared with other

Mr. Grant testified at the July 15, 1998, Open Meeting for Stakeholders as to the

functions, management personnel no longer spreading their costs over multiple functions, and employees who can no longer carry out multiple utility functions. Accordingly, the unit costs for metering, billing and collection functions would necessarily have to increase to maintain financial viability.

The focus of the last four years has been to deregulate <u>generation</u>. There has been no groundswell of public opinion demanding that competitive metering, billing, and collections be provided. Further, to the extent that customers, particularly residential customers, will benefit from deregulation, it will be generation deregulation that will provide the lion's share of the potential cost savings, not the deregulation of metering, billing, and collections.

It is possible that large competitive suppliers, who do have economies of scale, could move into the rural markets and take over the metering, billing, and collection services at lower costs. But the more likely result would leave customers saddled with higher costs. This is because the rural, second, and third-tier markets would probably not attract any of, or at best, only one or two of the larger players. Any that did enter this market would be faced with higher costs to serve these rural areas, but could charge whatever they pleased, largely unrestrained by competitive forces.

Requiring the provision of competitive metering, billing, and collections could potentially stand in the way of access to the generation market for Arizona's smaller towns and rural areas. If the UDC provides the services, it will likely be more expensive than the formerly regulated services. Other providers would likely also prove more expensive. This could cause the total price of electricity, including generation, competitive metering, billing, and collections, transmission and distribution, and system benefits charges to exceed former rates. Alternatively, if the UDC does not provide unregulated metering, billing, and collection services, a competitive generation provider might be faced with a difficult choice. It may have to also provide metering,

billing, and collections to enter the market – a service it may not even offer – or to purchase these services from a competitor, thereby subsidizing the competitor's ability to compete for the generation business.

A workable remedy for this issue is to allow Affected Utilities or UDCs to support competitive electric sales, by providing metering, billing, and collection services at rates regulated by the Commission. Energy Service Providers could either provide these services directly to customers or contract with the local UDC for metering, billing, and collection services at the tariffed rates. Through this arrangement, the existing economies from integration of these functions within UDCs will be maintained and both competition and regulation will provide the necessary restraint on pricing behavior. Further, UDCs, in their efforts to maintain market share, will likely expand their service options to meet the needs of competitive suppliers vying for customer business by providing new innovative services.

In its May 29, 1998, position paper on electric retail competition, the Staff supported the provision of competitive services by UDCs, a point absent from the current draft. Citizens urges the Commission to reconsider this issue and suggests that the following be added to R14-2-1605:

Affected Utilities and UDC's may provide metering, meter reading, billing, and collection services within their service territories at tariffed rates.

AFFILIATE TRANSACTION RULES

Citizens believes that the Commission has fully addressed the transactions between a public utility and its traditional affiliates in the Public Utility Holding Companies and Affiliated Interests Rules ("Affiliated Interest Rules")². In developing those rules, the Commission spent months reviewing issues with interested parties and considering policy implications. The resultant rules were carefully crafted to address transactions between a utility and a traditional affiliate.

Consequently, it is unnecessary for this Commission to address those areas in the current rulemaking. Therefore, in the Retail Electric Competition Rules, the Commission should focus on the transactions between the public utility and its competitive electric affiliates only. To have two sets of rules that overlap is troublesome, and leaves the door open to statutory construction arguments as to what rule is intended to apply. When one compares the Competitive Telecommunication Services Rules ³ to the Electric Competition Rules, questions of discrimination also arise. Why should the electric industry be held to a more burdensome regulatory standard than should the state's telecommunications providers? If this Commission believes that even more regulation is necessary for competitive providers, then that belief should also apply to competitive telecommunications providers (or even gas and water providers). The appropriate response would be for the Commission to examine the affiliate transaction rules in a separate docket that addresses all public utility industries.

While the Staff's July 10th draft of the proposed rule attempted to rein in the previous overly broad approach, there are still a number of changes that are necessary to make these rules fair and evenhanded. The most efficient way to approach this is to replace the term "Affiliate" with the term "Competitive Electric Affiliate," or, alternatively "ESP Affiliate."

Another particularly troubling proposed rule is **section R14-2-1617** (B)(3), which prohibits an Affected Utility or UDC from providing customers "advice" about its affiliates or other service providers. This ignores the fact that many consumers rely on the utility's customer service departments for obtaining information. This rule in effect puts a "gag order" on those customer service representatives.

A.A.C.R14-2-801 through R14-2-806.
 A.A.C. R14-2-1101 through R14-2-1115.

Citizens suggests two alternatives:

- 1) Simply delete this section of the rule, as any concerns regarding joint marketing are already addressed in R14-2-1617 (A)(3).
- 2) Allow the Affected Utilities and UDCs to provide consumer education information in response to inquiries. The Arizona Community Action Association suggested that "Consumer Education" be defined as "impartial information provided to consumers about competition or competitive services and is distinct from advertising and marketing." Citizens supports inclusion of this definition, and the ability of the utilities to provide such customer education information to its customers.

R14-2-1617 (A)(1) prevents customers from obtaining some of the benefits of competition. This proposed rule prohibits competitive electric affiliates from sharing office space, equipment, services and systems with an Affected Utility or UDC. This provision is inefficient and precludes the benefits of such economies from being passed on to regulated customers. As long as an affiliate provides full compensation for the services, sharing common facilities should be permitted where sound economic efficiencies and effective cost accounting policies and practices warrant it.

Clearly in the context of the Electric Competition Rules, there has been little chance for the parities to provide input on these important affiliate transaction issues. For many of the other substantive areas, work groups met over a number of months, with on-going dialogue and discussion. In contrast, there has been no such work group or task force addressing affiliate transactions. Further, there is no pressing reason to address these issues before the initial competitive phase.

Because of the lack of previous discussion and consensus building, and the absence of immediate need, there is no compelling reason to push this new section of the rules through in an "emergency" rulemaking. The appropriate approach would be to address these issues in the context of an "all-utility"

rulemaking. The second-best approach would be to focus only on electricaffiliate" issues in the formal rulemaking that is required to follow the planned "emergency" rulemaking.

For now, Citizens urges the Commission to immediately appoint a task force or work group to address electric-affiliate issues. Citizens would be pleased to participate.

INFORMATION DISCLOSURE LABEL

Citizens supports the overall intent of the information disclosure label in helping customers make informed choices about their electricity purchases. Citizens further believes that the range of data and information specified for the disclosure label, the disclosure report, and the terms of service is reasonable. However, certain requirements under proposed R14-2-1618 would be burdensome, costly, and unnecessary. Specifically, the requirement under R14-2-1618 (J) to distribute the disclosure label, the disclosure report, and the terms of service to any retail customer initiating service and to each retail customer on an annual basis would result in a costly waste of resources.

Citizens fully supports a requirement to make it known to any customer or potential customer that such information is available to them and to make it available to any person upon request. However to require distribution to each customer is unnecessary. To some, consideration of all this information will be important; to many others it will not be; providing it to these customers will accomplish nothing, except to raise costs. Citizens strongly urges the Staff to change R14-2-1618 (J) by: 1) changing "distributed" to "made available"; and 2) striking item number 2 requiring annual distribution.

OTHER COMMENTS:

<u>Page 10, R14-2-1606B</u>. Although the proposed rules would require that all standard-offer power be acquired by competitive bid, no guidance is provided. What type of bidding process is expected? Should all purchases be short-term spot purchases, or should some sort of integrated-resource-

planning process be required to first develop a forecast or need and the appropriate purchased-power portfolio to satisfy that need, before the bidding process is designed? With respect to comment about ratchet provisions being unreasonable, is this always true? If not, who makes the determination? Are there circumstances where ratchets may be appropriate?

Page 14, R14-2-1607H. If a utility divests its generation resources, its stranded costs will be set at that time. This benefit obviates the need for subsequent true-ups. What then is the purpose of the Commission ordering revisions to stranded cost estimates? If the revision only applies to new costs, such as transition costs, revisions might be appropriate, but not for stranded costs that are determined by the market.

<u>Page 14, R14-2-1608</u>. Upon the influence of significant exogenous factors or "events beyond the utility's control," can the three-year review period be shortened?

<u>Page 22, R14-2-1612A</u>. What is meant by "market determined rates?" What market, what service, and what time period? Some clarification is needed.

<u>Page 29, R14-2-1617A</u>. GAAP stands for "Generally Accepted Accounting <u>Principles</u>."

Page 30, R14-2-1617A7a. Often the service provided by the utility or UDC to the affiliate will not be tariffed. What is the appropriate price then? For reverse transfers, how is fair market value determined? What is the market and what if there is no market?

Page 32, R14-1617D. The audit procedure is still unclear. For example, no audit for 1999 can be done by 12/31/99. Some date after year end should be used, for example, June 1. This will allow all financial and regulatory audits to be completed before turning to this compliance audit.

<u>Page 36, R14-2-203D</u>. There needs to be a limit on the number of times in a year that a customer can switch from one ESP to another, or some time limit between switches. Chairman Irvin proposed this point.⁴

Back-up Power. Will the Affected Utility or UDC have any obligation to provide back-up generation service to a customer who departs to take competitive power? For, example, would there be a back-up obligation to an industrial purchaser purchasing competitive, interruptible service who plans to back-up the service with on-site generation? What if this purchaser's service were interrupted and the on-site generation were either out of service of uneconomical? If offered, how would it be priced? Would it be regulated?

Commission/RUCO Assessment. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 40-401, utilities are currently assessed annually to support the Commission and RUCO, based upon gross operating revenues derived from intrastate operations, for goods (electricity) to which they take title. In the competitive market, the UDCs will be delivering power for which they never take title. Further, some of this will be delivered from out-of-state, which raises interstate commerce issues. Can the UDCs be assessed under current state law for this power? If they cannot, can someone else legally be assessed? The Rules are silent on this issue; further legislation may be necessary.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of July, 1998.

Craig A. Marks

Associate General Counsel

Citizens Utilities Company

2901 N. Central Avenue, Ste. 1660

Phoenix, Arizona 85012

July 15, 1998, Open Meeting Stakeholders Comments, Tr. at 21-22.

Original and ten copies of the foregoing filed this 22nd day of July, 1998, with:

Docket Control Division Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 West Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007

Copies of the foregoing mailed or hand delivered this 22nd day of July, 1998, to:

Honorable Jim Irvin Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 West Washington Phoenix, Arizona 85007

Honorable Renz D. Jennings Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 West Washington Phoenix, Arizona 85007

Honorable Carl J. Kunasek Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 West Washington Phoenix, Arizona 85007

Jerry Rudibaugh Chief Hearing Officer Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 West Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007

Paul Bullis Christopher Kempley Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 West Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007

Ray Williamson
Acting Director, Utilities Division
Arizona Corporation Commission
1200 West Washington Street
Phoenix, Arizona 85007

All Parties indicated on Service List

By Joan Zychlewicz